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Research and Policy Note 
Customary Justice Sector Reform  
  
 
Janine Ubink 
Introduction 
Customary justice systems are a distinguishing feature in the landscape of the 
contemporary Third World. In many developing countries, customary justice systems 
remain the most important system for dispute settlement as well as for regulating 
important aspects of life, including access to land, water and other natural resources, 
and family matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. 
 
Africa is a prime example of where customary justice systems continue to dominate or 
made a comeback in the last decades. Also, in many Asian and Latin American countries, 
customary justice systems are vital. See for instance the role of adat in Indonesia and 
the disputes over recognition of customary indigenous group rights in Bolivia, Peru or 
Columbia. Customary justice systems even play a role in Northern America and Australia, 
where there have been intense struggles surrounding the recognition of ‗native‘ group 
rights. 
 
Over the last decade or more, customary justice systems have become an increasing 
priority for international organizations working in legal development cooperation. 
Traditionally, donor-led legal reform projects have emphasized formal institutions, such 
as the judiciary, legislators, the police and prisons, and paid less attention to customary 
justice systems. The prominence of customary justice systems has often been regarded 
as incompatible with the modern nation-state and therefore as something to be 
discouraged or ignored rather than strengthened or engaged with. Limited familiarity of 
both local and foreign lawyers with the concepts and content of customary law and 
pressure to achieve quick results are also mentioned as explanatory factors (Toomey 
2011). 
 
However, a growing body of evidence suggests that poor people in developing countries 
have limited access to the formal legal system. The limited effect of reforms in the state 
justice sector on the majority of the poor, combined with increased recognition of the 
wide reach and accessibility of customary justice systems have led to a changing attitude 
among donors towards customary justice systems and towards an interest in building on 
their positive elements for the benefit of the poor.  
 
This approach is consistent with the rise of ‗bottom-up‘ legal development cooperation 
approaches (Van Rooij 2009), which seek to directly reach the poor or marginalized 
groups through their interventions, instead of hoping that state law reform projects 
‗trickle down‘ to benefit those at the bottom of developing societies.  
 
To enable policymakers, academics, and donor institutions to better understand the 
nature of customary justice systems and to critically assess their functioning and the 
opportunities and modalities of programs to enhance their functioning, this Research & 
Policy Note will discuss the following issues 
- What are customary justice systems, why are they so important, and what are 
their most important positive and negative characteristics? 
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- What aspects of the complex nature of customary justice system need to be 
understood if legal reforms targeting customary justice systems are to be 
effective? 
- What approaches can be used to improve the functioning and effectiveness of 
customary justice systems?  
- What role does power play in these reforms? And can we come to a particular kind 
of legal empowerment for improving the functioning and effectiveness of 
customary justice systems? 
 
1. Customary Justice Systems: what are they and why are they 
important? 
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes customary justice. In 
general, customary systems of justice refer to the types of justice systems that exist at 
the local or community level, that have not been set up by the state, and that derive 
their legitimacy from the mores, values and traditions of the indigenous ethnic group. 
Although they are often indicated by the term ‗informal‘ or ‗non-state‘, they do not exist 
unrelated to, nor function independently from, state legal systems. On the contrary, 
customary and state legal systems define each other in their many interactions. 
 
Many other terms are used in the literature to describe customary justice systems, 
including traditional, non-state, informal, indigenous, local, community and folk law 
systems. In addition, many communities have their own names for their customary 
justice systems or their laws and courts, such as adat in Indonesia, xeer in Somalia and 
kastom in the Solomon Islands.  
 
Customary justice systems play a prominent role in the lives of many of the world‘s poor. 
They are the lived reality of most people in developing countries, especially in rural areas 
(see Box 1).  
 
BOX 1. The Prominence of Customary Justice Systems 
 
―In many developing countries traditional or customary legal systems account for 80% of total 
cases‖ (DFID 2002, 58). 
 
―(T)he majority of the population is often not in a position to access the formal legal system for 
various cultural, linguistic, financial or logistical reasons … Their access to justice largely depends 
on the functioning of informal systems‖ (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Danida 2000, vi, 
quoted in Golub 2006, 118). 
 
―(E)ven if the formal system were to operate fairly, free from corruption and in a timely manner, 
the average Liberian would still prefer the customary system. The customary system is perceived 
as more holistic, taking account of the underlying causes of a dispute and seeking to repair the 
tear in the social fabric, whereas the formal system is seen as overly adversarial, retributive, and 
narrow in its focus on the specific case at issue (Rawls 2011, 92). 
 
Customary justice ―governs the daily lives of more than three quarters of the populations of most 
African countries‖ (Sage and Woolcock 2006).  
 
―(U)p to 90 percent of cases in Nigeria are settled by customary courts‖ (Odinkalu 2006). 
 
 
People select customary justice institutions for various reasons. They can be attracted to 
the perceived positive attributes of customary justice institutions, their procedures and 
their outcome. Positive attributes associated with customary dispute settlement include 
physical accessibility, the use of familiar procedures and language, the limited costs of 
dispute settlement procedures, the short duration of case resolution, knowledge of the 
local context among the dispute settlers, and the more restorative nature of the process. 
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Disputants can also find themselves confronted with social pressure not to refer a dispute 
to a state court and some may fear reprisal or social ostracism should they enter the 
formal justice system. In addition, poor people‘s use of customary justice systems may 
reflect the limited access to and weakness of the formal justice systems, rather than an 
active choice for the former based on their satisfaction with them. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of customary dispute settlement for the majority of the 
poor, the prominence of customary justice systems in first instance lies more in the 
regulation of important aspects of daily life, such as access to land and natural resource 
management, and family issues such as inheritance and marriage, than in the settlement 
of occasional disputes. Several of the positive attributes of customary dispute settlement 
mentioned — including physical presence, familiarity with local context and limited costs 
— are also applicable to customary administration. In particular, in debates regarding 
natural resource management, food availability, and natural resource depletion and 
degradation, there are strong proponents of customary administration. They contend that 
the involvement of local people and their local normative systems enhance sustainable 
development. Local communities have a tradition of living close to nature and can thus 
provide insights into resource allocation, development and management that would not 
be exploited if a purely state-centric approach were adopted. In addition, the study of 
common pool resources management argues that customary, communal and natural 
resource management systems are more efficient and effective than their private or state 
alternatives (Ostrom 1999; UNDP 2005; Von Benda-Beckmann 2006). 
 
Despite the well-known and often acclaimed positive attributes of customary justice 
systems, ample studies display serious concern about their functioning. The most-
mentioned worries about customary justice systems include violation of human and 
constitutional rights, elite capture and the hampering effect of these systems on 
economic development. 
 
Violation human rights 
Customary law and customary dispute settlement and administration may violate human 
rights standards and constitutional provisions. This is partly caused by the fact that 
judges and community members are often not aware of human rights standards such as 
the right to equality and non-discrimination. Another problem is that customary criminal 
procedures do not necessarily provide victims and suspects with minimum fair trial and 
redress standards. Further, some local norms and practices, such as public humiliation 
and physical violence, or institutionalized discrimination of certain groups derived from 
traditional values and hierarchal notions may directly contradict human rights standards.  
 
A typical example is where customary justice systems lack gender equality and violate 
rights of non-discrimination. Customary systems are widely regarded as patriarchal and 
detrimental to women‘s rights to assets or opportunities. This critique is leveled both 
against processes of customary dispute settlement and customary administration. 
Dispute settlement issues include the fact that courts lack women judges, women face 
cultural impediments to participate in court debates, and in some cases are even 
required to have their interests represented by their husbands or male relatives. 
Customary administration issues include that most leadership positions are held by men 
and that land ownership is often vested in men, while women exercise only derived 
rights. Such norms and practices operate to create a gender bias, for instance in cases of 
inheritance and divorce. Some studies see the gender bias of customary justice systems 
as an incorrigible trait, and advocate for a complete disengagement with customary 
justice (Khadiagala 2001; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Others reason that customary 
systems will not disappear in the near future, and therefore the issue of reform should be 
taken seriously (Nyamu-Musembi 2003). The latter view is well received by legal 
reformers. 
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According to Clarke (2011), a superficial engagement with customary justice systems 
leads most development agencies to put a narrow emphasis on the human rights 
implications of customary justice, while neglecting other possibly negative attributes of 
customary justice systems such as a lack of transparency, minimal accountability and 
vulnerability to elite capture. In considering the rise of customary law in justice sector 
reform, he concludes that most justice reform policies undertake a simplistic balancing of 
customary justice systems‘ practical benefits – including accessibility, efficiency, 
legitimacy, social cohesion and participation – against the possible violations of human 
rights. 
 
Elite capture 
Customary justice systems can be susceptible to elite capture. In a setting of mediated 
or negotiated dispute settlement, domination by power holders can be detrimental to the 
poor and disempowered. Elite capture is especially problematic when customary checks 
and balances have eroded, such as procedures to depose malfunctioning chiefs. Some 
therefore argue that customary dispute resolution can only work if it is backed up by 
state law and if there is a possibility of state law as a last resort (Nader 2001).  
 
In studies dealing with customary land management, the danger of elite capture has also 
been widely recognized. A number of these studies demonstrate that local elites have 
been able to use their position and the ambiguities of customary law to appropriate land 
to further their own economic and political interests. This includes traditional leaders who 
have ruled arbitrarily, with few checks and balances on their administration, giving power 
considerations precedence over objectives of development (see Ubink 2008, 18 for an 
overview of this literature). 
 
BOX 2: Elite Capture and Power Inequalities 
 
Traditional and indigenous justice systems are susceptible to elite capture and may ―serve to 
reinforce existing hierarchies and social structures at the expense of disadvantaged groups‖ 
(United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005, 101). 
 
―Villagers and village leaders preferred to resolve corruption cases informally, perceiving informal 
mechanisms to be easier, quicker, cheaper and less socially disruptive than the formal legal 
system. They also feared and distrusted the formal legal system, viewing it as corrupt, unfair and 
inaccessible. Yet despite this preference, informal institutions failed to resolve corruption disputes 
where there were gross power imbalances between the perpetrators of corruption and the poor and 
marginalized communities from whom they had embezzled money‖ (World Bank 2004, 59). 
 
―(I)f there is any single generalization that has ensued from the anthropological research on 
disputing processes … it is that mediation and negotiation require conditions of relatively equal 
power‖ (Nader 2001, 22). 
 
 
Given that state systems can equally be captured by particular elites, a switch from 
customary to state law or disputing systems will not automatically solve this problem. 
Instead, both justice systems need to be harnessed against elite capture, incorporating 
proper checks and balances, stronger participation in norm formation, and guarantees for 
impartiality of adjudicators; this may be equally if not more challenging to do in 
customary than in state justice systems. 
 
Hampering economic development 
A third problem is that customary systems are deemed of limited effect in stimulating 
economic development. This view has been debated since the colonial period, but is now 
commonly linked to the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. He argues that most 
property and businesses of the poor are regulated in informal (non-state) normative 
systems and are not formally recognized by state law. This excludes them from 
participation in larger markets and hampers their access to formal loans. Proponents of 
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this view hold that ― e conomic transactions remain unpredictable, insecure, and limited‖ 
CLEP 2008, 26) and that assets regulated under a customary regime will not be linked to 
capital markets and thus remain underdeveloped. De Soto thus propounds the idea of 
finding bridges between informal non-state property arrangements and an accessible 
system of formal state law. De Soto‘s work, while often criticized, has become influential 
in law and development studies, and even more so among policy makers. 
 
Taking customary justice systems seriously 
Thus, there are a number of issues regarding the operation of customary justice systems 
that need to be addressed, including elite capture, human rights protection, and, in 
certain cases, the integration of non-state arrangements in wider capital markets. Many 
studies show that mere statutory regulation of customary processes and practices often 
has a limited effect on the locality. Taking this into account leads to a conclusion that the 
customary ‗arena‘, whether seen as an obstacle for legal empowerment of marginalized 
groups and community members or as an opportunity for such change, needs to be 
taken seriously. The current attitude of legal development practitioners towards 
customary justice systems seems to reflect an acceptance that they are simply too 
important to ignore, and that their flaws make the case for active involvement with 
customary justice systems only more compelling (Harper 2011). This is clearly 
demonstrated in northern Namibia, where the Owambo Traditional Authorities changed 
their customary laws through a process of self-statements (see Box 3). 
 
Box 3: Protecting Widows in Northern Namibia 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, leaders of six Owambo traditional communities in northern Namibia 
embarked on a self-statement of the most important substantive and procedural customary norms. 
The aims of the self-statement process specifically included the improvement of the legal status of 
women in line with the requirements of the Namibian Constitution. The leaders decided that certain 
rights abrogating norms should be proscribed. The first concerned the customary inheritance norm 
that when a man dies, his estate is inherited by his matrilineal family, which leaves the widow 
dependent on the husband‘s family. Despite a customary obligation of the husband‘s family to 
support needy widows and children, this often resulted in the widow and her children being chased 
out of the house. A second, related customary norm in Owambo was that when women remained 
on the land they had occupied with their husbands, they were required to make a payment to their 
traditional leaders for the land in question. Research undertaken in one of the Owambo Traditional 
Authorities in 2010 concludes that these adaptations in customary law are locally well-known and 
accepted and have almost eradicated the practice of property grabbing. This is especially 
remarkable when compared with the experiences of other African countries. Many African countries 
have attempted to outlaw similar practices by statutory intervention, but these efforts have nearly 
all had a marginal effect on customary practices in rural areas (Ubink 2011). 
 
 
2. The complexity of customary justice systems 
If legal reforms targeting customary justice systems are to be effective, development 
actors must understand and address their complex nature. Central to this complexity is 
the difficulty in identifying the appropriate norm that applies to certain behavior or to a 
dispute.  
 
Multiple versions of customary law 
First, there are multiple versions of customary law. In many countries, it is possible to 
distinguish between unwritten living customary law and written versions such as codified 
customary law and judicial customary law. Codified customary law refers to legislation 
codifying the customary law of a certain jurisdiction, whereas judicial customary law 
refers to the norms developed by judges when applying customary norms in courts. Both 
written versions provide legal certainty and accessibility to the customary law, while at 
the same time unifying, simplifying and crystallizing it, often in a formal language that is 
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different from that used in the original community. There may be considerable 
differences between these written versions of customary and living customary law – 
which refers to the norms that govern daily life in the community at the local level – 
because living customary norms are inherently dynamic.  
 
Ascertaining living customary law 
Since written versions of customary law may be as alien in local communities as state 
law, today there is increased recognition that engagement with customary justice 
systems implies engaging with living customary law. Ascertaining the norms of living 
customary law presents its own challenges. First of all, the ideal norms quoted by 
community members can be quite different from the norms applied by dispute settlement 
institutions or observed by community members in daily life outside of exceptional 
dispute cases (Holleman 1973; Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941). It can be generally said that 
customary justice systems do not aim to resolve disputes through adjudication, deciding 
who wins and loses, but through mediation, seeking to facilitate a settlement that is 
acceptable to the parties. In this process, customary norms do not serve to produce 
direct outcomes, but are the starting points for discussions leading towards settlements. 
To ascertain norms of customary law, ideally a combination of research methods 
comprising hypothetical questions, observation of dispute settlements and normal 
practices should be used, a process that can easily become expensive and time 
consuming.  
 
This complexity is compounded by the fact that within living customary law, there may 
be different or competing versions of particular norms both among and within different 
communities or customary groups (Chanock 1989). This is especially true in contexts 
where large economic or social transformations have occurred that have altered the 
social fabric and economic structures of the community, giving rise to competing values, 
for instance, concerning the position of women or what should be done with proceeds 
from newly available lucrative land deals. For this reason, who within the local 
community is asked about applicable customary norms, is critical. Relying solely on elite 
representatives, such as chiefs or elders, may easily lead to a biased representation of 
living customary norms, not only failing to capture the existing variety, but worse, failing 
to understand the versions that may benefit sub-altern community members. 
 
The unwritten character of living customary law, especially where contested and 
competing versions exist, imbeds a high level of flexibility in customary justice systems. 
Some see the negotiability and the aims towards settlement and mediation as opening 
up access to justice even for marginalized community members; others, however, point 
out that, in practice, not everything is negotiable and that some are in a better 
bargaining position than others  (Peters 2002; Ubink 2008; Woodhouse 2003). 
 
Legal development actors, and the state and non-state organizations they work with, 
often lack knowledge about the different versions of living customary norms, the 
negotiable nature of customary justice, and the implications this has for engagement 
with customary justice systems. Time and resource constraints easily result in quick 
studies that accept elite representations of customary law. Such accounts can overlook 
the fact that there are different versions of such law or that the elite version is contested. 
Projects that adopt such norms as their starting point may actually be strengthening the 
position of elites in the community while weakening the marginalized group they seek to 
empower. Likewise, power differentials may be strengthened where the negotiable 
nature of customary law is not taken into account, and efforts subsequently fail to focus 
on harnessing weaker parties in the negotiated settlement processes.  
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Box 4: The elusive oral nature of customary law 
 
Judges, policy makers and development agents all struggle to come to grips with the unwritten 
character of customary law. The main historical devices for recording customary law – 
codifications, restatements, and case law systems – all failed to become guidelines for local dispute 
settlement. Consequently, these efforts have created a large gap between living customary law and 
the recorded versions of customary law. Currently, the oral nature of customary law is hotly 
debated by rule of law practitioners. It is particularly distressing to proponents of the application of 
customary law in formal courts. In their opinion, if customary law cases are to be heard at or 
appealed to statutory courts, customary law needs to be documented. This is exactly what 
happened in Liberia, where the documentation of customary law is one of the main 
recommendations resulting from the National Conference on Enhancing Access to Justice. Also 
here, this proposal was put forward to assist and inform the formal courts in their application of 
customary law. But also in other cases, legal development agencies have shown an interest in the 
recording of customary law. In Aceh UNDP documented the best practices of procedural customary 
law. Similarly, in the World Bank‘s Strengthening Non-State Justice Systems pilot project in two 
areas of Indonesia (West Nusa Tenggara and West Sumatra) the codification and reform of 
customary rules and procedures are an integral part.  
 
Writing down customary laws runs the risk of ‗over-formalisation‘. In the process of recognizing 
local institutions, their flexibility to match the process, remedy and sanction to local realities could 
be undermined, and procedural flexibilities that can contribute to greater substantial justice may be 
lost. An additional risk is that the version of customary law adopted reflects discriminatory 
attitudes or power imbalances. In such circumstances, putting customary laws into writing may 
entrench poor justice for the poor and marginalised. The latter points to the need for inclusion of 
adequate safeguards, such as participatory processes and mechanisms for popular endorsement of 
the principles adopted. Both can be simple ways for all community members to gain better 
knowledge about customary law and participate in its evolution  
 
In several areas, including South Sudan, Rwanda, Ghana and northern Namibia, traditional 
communities or authorities are now undertaking their own recording efforts, or are considering to 
do so. The self-recordings undertaken by the Owambo Traditional Authorities in northern Namibia 
have been a success, in the sense that they have become the accepted new local law, informing 
customary dispute settlement. They are constantly referred to in traditional courts and are widely 
regarded as the normative framework upon which traditional leaders base their decisions. 
Obviously, the success of ‗self-statements‘ raises questions in relation to the extent of and manner 
in which  recordings can be stimulated or induced by external actors. An additional question is 
whether all customary norms are suitable for recording. For instance one can imagine that common 
procedural norms and criminal norms and sanctions are more easily codified than highly negotiable 
norms such as those regarding marriage, without locking in one person or group‘s interpretation of 
local norms (Clark and Stephens 2011, Clarke 2011, Harper 2011, Rawls 2011, Ubink 2011). 
 
 
3. Two approaches 
This Research and Policy Note discusses two general approaches for facilitating improved 
functioning and effectiveness of customary justice systems: stimulating linkages between 
customary and state justice systems, and community-based activities directed at citizens 
governed by customary justice systems and their leaders. It demonstrates how the 
different and complex character of customary law impacts on and offers challenges and 
opportunities for customary legal empowerment. 
 
3.1 The institutional approach: linking customary and state justice 
systems 
 
An important method used to improve the functioning and effectiveness of customary 
justice systems is to develop institutional links between customary and state justice 
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systems. One can distinguish three types of linkages: between state and customary 
norms; between state and customary dispute resolution mechanisms; and between state 
and customary administration. Such linkages have the potential to incorporate human 
rights into customary norms, dispute resolution and administration, and to create checks 
and balances against elite capture. Linking customary and state justice systems is also 
seen as a means of enhancing the certainty and accessibility of local norms, which can 
help stimulate economic growth in customary settings.  
 
Box 5: Hybrid justice systems  
 
Institutional linkages between state and customary justice systems can and do take many forms. 
Samuel Clark and Matt Stephens propose to call the result ‗a hybrid justice system‘, thereby 
highlighting the interconnectedness of institutions and norms with various origins and sources of 
legitimacy – state and ‗tradition‘. The term marks the indivisibility of the resulting justice system 
and thereby refutes the constructed dichotomy between state and customary justice systems. In 
addition, it questions the one-sided attention to incorporating the strengths of customary justice 
systems into state justice systems (while mitigating their weaknesses), but rather advocates for 
blending the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses of both customary and formal justice 
systems. Rather than idealizing one justice system over the other, they propose a more realistic 
strategy by focusing on overcoming the specific injustices of both state and customary systems 
(Clarke and Stephens, 2011). 
 
 
3.1.1 Linking norms 
The weakest institutional normative linkage is when a state recognizes customary law 
without specifying its contents, for instance through a provision in the constitution or in 
another relevant law relating to the application of customary law. Such general 
recognition can improve the effectiveness and strength of customary norms vis-à-vis 
external parties, but little affects the intra-communal issues mentioned above. 
 
A stronger institutional normative linkage can be created through the codification of 
customary norms into state legislation. This involves a process of selecting between the 
different versions of customary law that exist within a country (as occurs in any type of 
codification) through which the norms deemed unfavorable in terms of human rights, 
protection of marginalized groups or the stimulation of economic activity can be adapted 
or discarded. Codification has the additional benefit of making complex and varied norms 
more certain and accessible, including to those outside of local communities or those 
lacking the research resources necessary to understand local norms. Accordingly, the 
increased accessibility and certainty of customary norms could theoretically allow for 
economic transactions at a larger scale, and thus help support economic activities 
between the community and external markets, hence stimulating economic growth. 
There are, however, also a number of reasons to be hesitant about codifying living 
customary law, as this can affect the fluid, informal and accessible character of the 
original customary norms. Additionally, codification without a proper study of the 
variations of customary norms within a community, and especially when sub-altern 
versions are not taken into account, may have the effect to strengthen the norms 
governing elite interests. Moreover, codification of customary norms faces grave 
problems of credibility and acceptability, and might be ignored by many as not reflecting 
their rules of customary law. Ultimately, such codification may lead to another layer of 
written customary law while doing little to address the problems within the living 
customary justice system. 
 
3.1.2 Linking dispute resolution mechanisms 
A first method of linking customary dispute resolution mechanisms to the state legal 
system is through the establishment of customary courts presided over by traditional 
authorities as the first tier of the legal system. Thus incorporated, traditional authorities 
can be required to administer justice in accordance with certain procedures and while 
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maintaining human rights standards. When a system of appeal is established, this opens 
up possibilities for state courts to oversee the adjudicative work of customary courts, and 
for the development of checks and balances that can ensure adherence to procedural and 
substantive standards. The question is whether such checks and balances would work in 
practice. First, citizens may not be able to invoke their rights in state courts even when 
the right of appeal exists because the basic conditions required for access are still 
lacking. Second, appeal judgments may do little to affect the work of customary dispute 
resolution mechanisms outside of the case in question (Ubink 2002-4).  
 
A different method for linking dispute resolution mechanisms is through allowing state 
courts to adjudicate cases on the basis of customary rules. This creates a link between 
customary and state justice systems that involves norms as well as dispute settlement 
mechanisms – and thus straddles the divide between this section and the latter. The 
advantage of this type of linkage is that state judges may be well placed to safeguard 
human rights and fair procedural standards when applying customary law. The 
involvement of state courts also diminishes opportunities for elite cooptation. Due to 
their written character, state customary judgments may offer increased certainty and 
accessibility of customary law, which may in turn enhance predictability and security of 
economic transactions and thus facilitate participation in larger economic markets. On 
the other hand, state courts are less accessible, especially to marginalized citizens, and 
their judgments may have limited impact on living customary norms (Ubink 2002-4). The 
formal character of state court decisions is exacerbated because many judges are trained 
to base their decisions on written texts and thus prefer to apply codified or judicial 
customary law (based on earlier decisions) rather than attempt to understand and apply 
living customary law.  
 
The integration of state and non-state law in state courts is thus highly difficult and can 
lead to situations where court decisions are out of step with local realities and thus have 
limited impact. Alternatively, they can result in courts strengthening elites who may play 
a dominant role in providing information, especially about contested norms.  
 
Recently, some innovative approaches to incorporating customary dispute settlement 
systems into the state legal system have been undertaken that seem to enhance the 
quality of the customary as well as the state justice system, for example in Eritrea (see 
Box 6). 
 
Box 6: Community courts in Eritrea  
 
In 2003, Eritrea established a system of community courts. This system was created with the aim 
of bringing the state legal system both physically and psychologically closer to the people while 
integrating and formalizing customary dispute resolution processes into its lowest tier of courts. To 
achieve this effect, these courts combine the powers of both systems in an attempt to reconcile 
disputants, most likely on the basis of customary law and practices, and when such negotiations 
fail, to pass judgement based on national laws. The courts consist of three judges, who are locally 
elected. Uniform election rules have not been formulated, with the intention to allow each 
community to resort to its preferred, most probably customary, processes of electing community 
leaders and judges. Although not specifically required by law, in practice, it is expected that as far 
as practicable at least one of the judges of each community court must be a woman. This resulted 
in 20 percent women judges in 2003 which increased to 28.4 percent in 2008.  
 
Research in 2009 highlights the successful role community courts have played in tackling barriers 
to justice and reaching out of court settlements and in increasing community participation and the 
role of women in the legal process. The congestion of state courts is eased by the cases that are 
settled amicably. In addition, access to the state justice system, at least to the first tier of the 
courts system, is significantly enhanced by the fact that the local dispute settler is the same person 
as the local state judge. This will bring statutory law and fora closer to the people. Knowledge and 
proximity will increase the ‗shadow of state law‘ which in turn can have a positive effect on the 
quality of customary dispute settlement. As parties now have the opportunity to opt out of the 
customary system and seek the protection of the state justice system, they can more easily reject 
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 the pressure of accepting what they regard as an unfair settlement. All they have to do is refuse 
to settle and they will automatically receive a judgment on the basis of statutory law.  
 
This research furthermore suggests that the incorporation of customary dispute settlement into the 
state justice system allows for innovations to customary dispute settlement, such as the inclusion 
of women ‗judges‘, and the infusion of ideas and norms emanating from the state justice system. 
Simultaneously, it seems able to preserve some of the positive attributes of customary dispute 
settlement, such as proximity, limited financial barriers, local language and basic procedures. By 
creating such an inseparable linkage between the forum of dispute settlement and the formal court 
of first instance, the Eritrean approach is thus able to overcome a number of the weaknesses of 
customary or integrated (‗hybrid‖) justice systems: that they are not effective when powerful third 
parties are involved, that they fail to protect the rights and interests of women, that they 
sometimes ignore the punitive and deterrent justice objectives, and the fact that state institutions 
accidentally or deliberately overlook certain customary cases (Andemariam 2011). 
 
 
3.1.3 Linking administration 
A third form of state and customary institutional linkages that may improve the 
functioning of customary justice systems is by linking state and customary 
administration. Administration, often neglected by policymakers and practitioners 
engaging with customary justice systems, needs to be addressed as it plays an important 
role in the implementation of customary law. Moreover, customary administrators can be 
involved in local power abuses or human rights violations. Linking customary and state 
administration should ideally increase the accountability of customary administration, 
prevent power abuse and human rights violations, and enhance predictability and 
security of customary administration, and thus facilitate local transactions for external 
economic actors. However, it should do so without undermining the local legitimacy of 
customary administrators. There are four main ways in which state and customary 
administration can be linked (Bako-Arifari 1999; Hlatshwayo 1998; Ubink 2008). The 
state can recognize customary administration without defining official roles for traditional 
leaders, nor interfering with their activities as long as the law is not broken. This does 
little to reform customary administration. For this to occur, a more elaborate linkage is 
necessary, for example, by integrating customary administrators into the state 
administration system and defining their customary functions and/or delegating them 
formal state functions. The state can establish a local state structure parallel to the 
customary administration, aiming to achieve a local balance of power. Hybrid local 
structures can be established in which both state and customary administrators are 
represented. 
 
In the four above-mentioned links, the extent to which customary administration is made 
subordinate and answerable to state organs varies. Several mechanisms can be 
employed to boost the accountability of customary administrators. When states formalize 
customary administration, they can legally define their authority as well as provide 
details as to the way it should be exercised. Such forms of regulation can then be 
implemented legally when administrative abuses are questioned in court. Customary 
authorities may also be bound to regulations through political or administrative means. 
Payment of salary establishes a certain amount of administrative control, and can also be 
seen as a way to transform chiefs into civil servants, accountable to senior civil servants 
and subject to disciplinary sanctions (Englebert 2002). Additionally, the provision of a 
salary could diminish chiefs‘ incentives for self-enrichment or corruption in the discharge 
of their responsibilities and for holding on to outdated customs that yield financial 
benefits. Another political mechanism is the state exercising the power to ratify the 
appointment of traditional leaders, and thus also to withhold such ratification. It should 
be noted that the motives for replacing customary administrators often involve power-
political considerations as well as issues of customary maladministration. 
 
Formal recognition of the institution of traditional authority by the state can transform 
the position and legitimacy of traditional leaders. On the one hand, it can strengthen the 
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position of traditional authorities or, in countries where such positions had previously 
been abolished such as in Guinea and Mozambique, it can assist their resurgence. On the 
other hand, formal recognition may cause leaders to lose their independence and risk 
that they be identified with state politics and state failure. State influence on the 
selection of individual candidates further impacts their independence. Achieving 
accountability can therefore come at a cost of undermining the position of customary 
administrators. At the same time, there is a real danger that administrative linkages will 
fail to deliver results in terms of accountability and prevention of power and human 
rights abuses. Mechanisms to ensure compliance with formalized limits of delegation and 
standards of administration remain weak, especially since they are often not strongly 
exercised. Here, local and national power structures are influential. In countries where 
customary authorities have a strong national power base, either for historical reasons or 
through their role in national elections as vote brokers, state authorities may not be able 
or even willing to ensure compliance through legal, administrative or political 
mechanisms. Even a highly formalized customary-state linkage may have little effect in 
such situations. Linking customary and state administration may even run the danger 
that local state institutions aligned with customary administration, and especially hybrid 
state-customary institutions, are co-opted by customary power holders. Ironically, then, 
linkages sought to deal with power abuses may only strengthen them. 
 
3.1.4 A Balancing Act  
Clearly, institutional linkages, whether sought through norms, disputing mechanisms or 
administration, are important mechanisms for improving the functioning of customary 
justice systems; however, establishing links that help attain this goal remains difficult. 
Linkages may alter customary arrangements, changing their nature in such a way that 
the original strengths of customary justice systems, its informal and accessible character, 
no longer exist. One needs to be cautious, for instance, that institutional linkages do not 
place so many restrictions and conditions on customary forms of administration, dispute 
settlement and management of resources, that in effect there is no real space for 
customary institutions and decision-making processes to function (see Box 7 for an 
example). Alternatively, the effect of linkages may be thwarted or co-opted by customary 
elites and therefore fail to accomplish its goal. The main challenge for approaches to 
institutional linkages, therefore, is to find a balance between retaining the informal 
character, local accessibility and legitimacy of the customary justice system, while 
making sufficient improvements on its functioning.  
 
Box 7: Recognition of indigenous rights and structures in Peru 
  
The Peruvian Constitution provides that peasant and native communities are autonomous in their 
organization, in the use and free disposition of their land, and in the economic and administrative 
management within the framework established by law. The qualification ―within the framework 
established by law‖ strongly limits the apparent organizational autonomy, as Peruvian regulations 
prescribe an organizational structure consisting of a general assembly and a board of directors, 
periodically elected by means of a ―personal, equal, free, secret and obligatory‖ vote, which is 
foreign to indigenous communities‘ customary organizational forms. Also with respect to land use 
and economic issues, peasant and native communities are not as autonomous as the Constitution 
portrays them as being. In reality, economic policies are decided by the national government, with 
little or no involvement of indigenous peoples. The autonomy in administrative management is 
furthermore limited by the system of political authorities installed by the Peruvian state, which 
represent the executive power in the locality and are charged with watching over the 
implementation of government policies as well as with monitoring compliance with the Constitution 
and laws. The Peruvian Constitution also establishes the judicial autonomy of peasant and native 
communities, again under a qualification, viz. ―whenever the fundamental rights of the person are 
not violated‖. Recent research argues that in all these domains, one remains within the logic of 
state law and there is no real space for customary institutions and decision-making processes to 
function (Desmet 2011). 
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It should be noted that donors may find it difficult to make institutional linkages an 
object of project-type intervention, because they are often bound up in larger historical 
transformations occurring within national politics, and their reform is usually a national 
affair where international donors play only a limited role (see Box 8). Linkages remain 
important, however, because they impact on the functioning of customary justice 
systems and can serve as entry points for inducing change. International donors should 
thus be aware of existing institutional links and the extent to which they can be altered 
within the national or local polity as a means of affecting the functioning of customary 
systems. Here, reform can also address state institutions that are linked to customary 
justice institutions, as improvement in the functioning of state institutions may benefit 
the functioning of the linked customary institution. 
 
Box 8: Justice reform in Liberia 
 
Over the last few years, the Liberian government has engaged in a process of analyzing, re-
considering, and restructuring the interaction among customary and statutory law and justice 
mechanisms in the country. This process was supported by research, funding and policy advise 
from several donors. Research undertaken in 2009 and 2010 suggests that the priorities of the 
Liberian government to a certain extent differed from the considerations of outside rule of law 
practitioners. Local research clearly showed that the formal justice system is not the forum of 
choice for most Liberians, and that this would probably remain unchanged even if its functioning 
were improved. Despite this popular feeling, government displayed a strong preference for building 
trust in the formal legal system. This was fueled partly by an awareness of the international 
community‘s concern with human rights violations under customary law. The influence of legal 
scholars and certain government branches and individuals also worked against policy options that 
would take away too much power from the formal legal system. Justice reform is often seen as a 
project of decades that cannot be rushed without jeopardizing the quality of the result. At the same 
time the Liberian government has an urgent need to establish and maintain a government 
monopoly on the use of force and decrease the incidence of mob violence and violent crime, which 
created pressure for policy options that provide fast results. The need to balance the power of 
government branches, ministries, agencies and individuals with a stake in the structure of the 
justice system also serves as a constraint on any policy options that might shift power from one 
part of the government to another (Rawls 2011) 
 
3.2. Community-based approaches 
Another approach to improve the functioning and effectiveness of customary justice 
systems is to target activities at marginalized community members. Such activities 
include the deployment of paralegals, legal literacy training, community mapping of local 
land rights and rights education campaigns. Such interventions can stimulate a demand 
for rights within the community, which can then translate into pressure on customary 
justice systems to better protect human rights. They can also empower marginalized 
community members and reduce power imbalances and elite capture. Such interventions 
are promising because they seem better equipped to directly benefit marginalized 
citizens governed by customary law, and may be able to address issues of power 
imbalances as they occur within the customary systems, without pushing for an 
alteration of the system‘s basic tenets. 
 
Box 9: UNDP‘s experiences with community-based approaches 
Successes: 
- Dialogues with elders and community leaders in Somalia helped to improve local dispute 
resolution mechanisms to make them more aligned with human rights standards and the 
protection of weaker groups; 
- legal awareness training through literacy courses, information groups, education campaigns, 
the publication of guidebooks on state and non-state laws, and itinerant street theatres helped 
improve the position of vulnerable groups and provided entry points for human rights in 
Bangladesh, Malawi, Timor-Leste, Indonesia and Cambodia; 
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- legal aid was enhanced through paralegals, lawyers‘ networks, dispute clearing houses, dispute 
resolution panels and ADR training in Sierra Leone, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Puerto Rico and 
Cambodia;  
- capacity development for informal justice actors in the areas of mediation and citizen‘s rights 
worked reasonably well in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Rwanda and Bangladesh.  
 
Challenges: 
- It was difficult to train lay persons into paralegals in Thailand; 
- capacity-building of informal justice institutions brings about challenges when 
* ceremony becomes more important than capacity (encountered in Burundi); 
* gender quotas for dispute settlers undermine community cohesion (Burundi); 
* reconciliation emphasis is unsatisfactory for aggrieved parties (East Timor); 
* strengthening informal dispute mechanisms perpetuates the absence of formal  
   institutions (Peru); and 
* newly built capacity lacks sustainability (Peru, Bangladesh) and local legitimacy  
   (Bangladesh).(Wojkowska 2006) 
 
 
Community-based approaches often explore the use of national or international state 
norms and institutions. They seek to contrast the functioning of customary justice with 
norms of state justice, for example, by raising awareness of state justice norms, 
organizing debates among customary authorities about international human rights 
standards, or providing legal aid to pursue litigation of customary abuses in state courts. 
Such strategies thus try to improve the functioning of customary justice systems by 
invoking the authority and power of justice institutions external to the local community. 
Community-based approaches can also focus on intra-community institutional changes, 
with a less explicit recourse to the state, for example, through local activists who work to 
improve customary dispute procedures and administrative checks and balances or to 
make structures of customary leadership or dispute settlement more inclusive.  
 
Community-based activities can be most effective when they are able to make use of the 
opportunities offered by the flexibility and negotiability inherent in customary justice 
systems. Improvements can be achieved by identifying, voicing and supporting versions 
of living customary norms that favor marginalized groups, by supporting the 
marginalized in dispute-related negotiations, or by seeking to reinvigorate customary 
administrative checks and balances. The full possibility, potential impacts and limits of 
using the opportunities offered by customary justice systems, however, remain largely 
understudied. 
 
Community-based activities are an important addition to institutional approaches when 
seeking to improve the functioning of customary justice systems. They are a critical 
component of donor-led reforms as they can be initiated more easily than institutional 
linkages, which are more dependent on national politics. Community-based interventions 
and institutional linkages reinforce each other. On the one hand, community-based 
activities help to improve the functioning of institutional linkages, by enhancing 
awareness of state norms and invoking state rights and related state dispute and 
administrative procedures in customary settings, and by diminishing resistance against 
state norms and institutions. On the other hand, community-based interventions often 
require linkages to strengthen the functioning of customary justice.  
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4. Addressing power - Customary legal empowerment 
The distribution of power plays a vital role in improving the functioning of customary 
justice systems. Legal reforms that aim to empower marginalized groups may decrease 
the relative local power base of original elites. However, insufficient knowledge of the 
complexity of customary justice systems may cause linkages to be forged between state 
institutions and elite norms and institutions in the customary justice system, thereby 
strengthening the subordinate position of marginalized community members. Elite power 
is also a hindrance for institutional and community-based activities as customary power 
holders have been able to resist and co-opt reforms, especially when they are seen as a 
threat to the elite power base. 
 
Bottom-up legal development approaches stress the importance of taking into 
consideration that law and power are intrinsically linked, expressing this most clearly 
through the concept of ‗legal empowerment‘. This concept, used (albeit with slightly 
different meanings) at the international level, including by the Commission for Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP), UNDP, the World Bank, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the FAO, reflects that legal tools may be used to 
empower marginalized citizens and attain greater control over the decisions and 
processes that affect their lives (ADB 2001; CLEP 2008; Cotula 2007; Golub 2005; 
USAID 2007). Legal empowerment could also refer to activities undertaken to tackle 
power asymmetries that undermine the effective functioning of legal tools for 
marginalized citizens, preventing access to justice and ultimately their development 
(Tuori 1997). 
 
Addressing problems in customary justice systems requires a form of legal 
empowerment. Organizations working on community-based activities have experimented 
with borrowing from state law attempts at legal empowerment, employing a combination 
of education and action by enhancing awareness, improving legal aid, and advocating for 
better rights. It is important to recognize that rights awareness, legal aid or rights 
advocacy may require rethinking when undertaken in the context of customary justice 
systems. Such activities often refer to state law: awareness of human rights or national 
legislation, legal aid to pursue actions in state courts or advocacy to obtain better legal 
protection under national legislation. However, it is possible to envisage customary legal 
awareness, customary legal aid or customary rights advocacy that focuses on the norms 
and institutions in the customary system to press for favorable change from within.  
 
Therefore, improving the functioning and effectiveness of customary justice systems 
requires a particular kind of legal empowerment  ‗Customary Legal Empowerment‘.  This 
can be defined as processes that: i) enhance the operation of customary justice systems 
by improving the representation and participation of marginalized community members, 
and by integrating safeguards aimed at protecting the rights and security of marginalized 
community members; and/or ii) improve the ability of marginalized community members 
to make use of customary justice systems to uphold their rights and obtain outcomes 
that are fair and equitable.  
 
In this regard, we need to highlight the relevance of historical knowledge. When 
historical processes have disempowered certain segments of customary communities 
these imbalances must be addressed if state recognition of rights of customary groups is 
to benefit marginalized community members. This is also one of the main lessons learned 
from failed attempts to increase tenure security and production through the formalisation 
of land rights. As processes of disempowerment may have started long ago, this 
necessitates an approach that understands contemporary practices as embedded in 
history. The importance of an historical approach is underscored by the realization that 
most encounters with colonial powers as well as missionaries have significantly altered 
customary justice systems, and almost exclusively in favor of male elders. Failing to 
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address historical power imbalances can lead to the contradictory result that legal 
empowerment of a customary community can simultaneously lead to the 
disempowerment of certain groups or individuals within that community (see Box 10).  
 
Box 10: Land Tenure in the Solomon Islands 
 
On the Bareke Peninsula in the Solomon Islands, the colonial legal system facilitated a strategic 
simplification of the land tenure system, by enabling certain male leaders to consolidate their 
control over the land. In many instances, the foreigners‘ perceptions of property and authority 
enabled male leaders – who historically had been ―caretakers‖ of the land – to claim rights 
wholesale. The resulting alteration in power relations is currently reified by provisions in the state 
legal system regulating logging activities on customary land. Legislation provides that any person 
who is interested in logging customary land must negotiate with the owners of the land. As was the 
case with traders, missionaries and colonial administrators before them, logging companies desire 
to indentify and engage with individuals rather than the entire customary community. This is 
facilitated by the requirements of the state legal system, which provides for the selection of certain 
individuals to negotiate with the logging company on behalf of the customary community. This 
enables a small number of individuals to carve out a ‗big man‘ status and strengthen their power 
base within their tribe by obtaining and distributing logging revenue. While many men are 
marginalised by these processes, women as a social group are particularly likely to be excluded 
(Monson 2011). 
 
 
 
  
 
16 Research and Policy Note - Customary Justice Sector Reform 
5. Literature 
Andemariam, S.W. "Ensuring Access to Justice through Community Courts in Eritrea." In 
Customary Justice: perspectives on Legal Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 113-
29. Rome: International Development Law Organization, Van Vollenhoven 
Institute, 2011 
Asian Development Bank. "Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank." 
Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2001. 
Bako-Arifari, N. "Traditional local institutions, social capital and the process of 
decentralisation. A typology of government policies in developing countries." In 
Working papers on African societies. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1999. 
Chanock, M. "Neither customary nor legal: African customary law in an era of family law 
reform." International Journal of Law and the Family 3 (1989): 172-87 
Clark, S., and M. Stephens. "Reducing Injustice? A Grounded Apprach to Strengthening 
Hybrid Justice Systems: Lessons from Indonesia." In Customary Justice: 
Perspectives on Legal Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 67-89. Rome: 
International Development Law Organization, Van Vollenhoven Institute, 2011 
Clarke, R. "Customary Legal Empowerment: Towards a More Critical Approach." In 
Customary Justice: Perspectives on Legal Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 43-
65. Rome: International Development Law Organization, Van Vollenhoven 
Institute, 2011 
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. "Making the Law work for Everyone. 
Volume I. Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor." New 
York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, 2008. 
Cotula, L. "Legal Empowerment for Local Resource Control. Securing local resource rights 
within foreign investment projects in Africa." London: IIED, 2007. 
De Soto, H. The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails 
everywhere else? London: Black Swan, 2000 
Desmet, E. "Interaction between Customary Legal Systems and the Formal Legal System 
of Peru." In Customary Justice: Perspectives on Legal Empowerment, edited by J. 
Ubink, 151-67. Rome: International Development Law Organization, Van 
Vollenhoven Institute, 2011 
DFID. "Safety, security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into Practice." DFID, 2002. 
Englebert, P. "Patterns and theories of traditional resurgence in tropical Africa." Mondes 
en Développement 30, no. 118 (2002): 51-64 
Golub, S. "A House Without Foundation." In Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad, In search 
of knowledge, edited by T. Carothers, 105-36. Washington D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006 
Golub, S. "Less law and reform, more politics and enforcement: A civil society approach 
to integrating rights and development." In Human Rights and Development: 
Towards mutual reinforcement, edited by P. Alston and M. Robinson, 297-324. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 
Harper, E. "Engaging with Customary Justice Systems." In Customary Justice: 
Perspectives on Legal Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 29-41. Rome: 
International Development Law Organization, Van Vollenhoven Institute, 2011 
Hlatshwayo, B. "Harmonizing traditional and elected structures at the local level: 
Experiences of four Southern African Development Community countries." In 
Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa, edited by F.M. 
d'Engelbronner-Kolff, M.O. Hinz and J.L. Sindano. Windhoek: Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences, University of Namibia, 1998 
Holleman, J.F. "Trouble-cases and trouble-less cases in the study of customary law and 
legal reform." Law & Society Review 7, no. 4 (1973): 585-609 
Khadiagala, L.S. "The failure of popular justice in Uganda: Local councils and women's 
property rights." Development and Change 32 (2001): 55-76 
Llewellyn, K.N., and E.A. Hoebel. The Cheyenne Way. Conflict and Case Law in Primitive 
Jurisprudence. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941 
  
 
17 Research and Policy Note - Customary Justice Sector Reform 
Monson, R. "Negotiating Land Tenure: Women, Men and the Transformation of Land 
Tenure in Solomon Islands." In Customary Justice: Perspectives on Legal 
Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 169-85. Rome: International Development Law 
Organization, Van Vollenhoven Institute, 2011 
Nader, L. "The Underside of Conflict Management ― in Africa and Elsewhere." IDS 
Bulletin 32, no. 1 (2001): 19-28 
Nyamu-Musembi, C. "Review of experience in engaging with 'non-state' justice systems 
in East Africa. Commissioned by Governance Dvision, DfID (UK)." 2003. 
Odinkalu, C.A. "Poor Justice or Justice for the Poor? A Policy Framework for Reform of 
Customary and Informal Justice Systems in Africa." In The World Bank Legal 
Review, Law, Equity, and Development, Volume 2, edited by C. Sage and M. 
Woolcock, 141-65. Washington: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006 
Ostrom, E. "Private and Common Property Rights." In Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, edited by B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest, 323-79. Gent: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 1999 
Peters, P.E. "The limits of negotiability: Security, equity and class formation in Africa's 
legal systems." In Negotiating Property in Africa, edited by K. Juul and C. Lund, 
45-66. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002 
Rawls, A.C. "Policy Proposals for Justice Reform in Liberia: Opportunities under the 
Current Legal Framework to Expand Access to Justice." In Customary Justice: 
Perspectives on Legal Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 91-111. Rome: 
International Development Law Organization, Van Vollenhoven Institute, 2011 
Sage, C., and M. Woolcock, eds. The World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and 
Development. Vol. 2: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006 
Toomey, L.T. "A Delicate Balance: Building complementary customary and state legal 
systems." The Law and Development Review 3, no. 1 (2011): 156-208 
Tuori, K. "Law, Power and Critique." In Law and Power: Critical and Socio-Legal essays, 
edited by K. Tuori, Z. Bankowski and J. Uusitalo, 7-29. Liverpool: Deborah Charles 
Publications, 1997 
Ubink, J. "Stating the Customary: An Innovative Approach to the Locally Legitimate 
Recording of Customary Law in Namibia." In Customary Justice: Perspectives on 
Legal Empowerment, edited by J. Ubink, 131-49. Rome: International 
Development Law Organization, Van Vollenhoven Institute, 2011 
Ubink, J.M. "Courts and peri-urban practice: Customary land law in Ghana." University of 
Ghana Law Journal XXII (2002-2004): 25-77 
Ubink, J.M. In the Land of the Chiefs: Customary Law, Land Conflicts, and the Role of the 
State in Peri-urban Ghana, Law, Governance and Development. Leiden: Leiden 
University Press, 2008 
Ubink, J.M. "Negotiated or negated? The rhetoric and reality of customary tenure in an 
Ashanti village in Ghana." Africa 78, no. 2 (2008): 264-87 
Ubink, J.M. Traditional authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an era of democratisation, 
Research and Policy Note. Leiden: Leiden university Press, 2008 
Ubink, J.M., A.J. Hoekema, and W.A. Assies, eds. Legalizing Land Rights: Local practices, 
state responses and tenure security in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Leiden: 
Leiden University Press, 2009 
UNDP. "Programming for Justice: Access for All. A practitioner's guide to a human rights-
based approach to access to justice." Bangkok: UNDP, 2005. 
USAID. "Legal Empowerment of the Poor: From concepts to assessments." USAID, 2007. 
Van Rooij, B. "Bringing Justice to the Poor: Bottom-Up Legal Development Cooperation." 
Working Paper, March 25, 2009, Available at SSRN, 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1368185 (2009) 
Von Benda-Beckman, F. "The Mutiple Edges of Law: Dealing with Legal Pluralism in 
Development Practice." In The World Bank Legal Review, Law, Equity, and 
Development, Volume 2, edited by C. Sage and M. Woolcock, 51-86. Washington: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006 
  
 
18 Research and Policy Note - Customary Justice Sector Reform 
Whitehead, A., and D. Tsikata. "Policy discourses on women's land rights in sub-Saharan 
Africa: The implications of the re-turn to the customary." Journal of Agrarian 
Change 3, no. 1 and 2 (2003): 67-112 
Wojkowska, E. "Doing Justice: How informal justice systems can contribute." UNDP, 2006. 
Woodhouse, P. "African enclosures: A default mode of development." World Development 
31, no. 10 (2003): 1705-20 
World Bank. Village Justice in Indonesia, Case studies on access to justice, village 
Democracy and governance. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2004 
